Perception arises through an interaction between sensory input and prior knowledge. We propose that at least two brain areas are required for such an interaction: the`site' where analysis of a¡erent signals occurs and the`source' which applies the relevant prior knowledge. In the human brain, functional imaging studies have demonstrated that selective attention modi¢es activity in early visual processing areas speci¢c to the attended feature. Early processing areas are also modi¢ed when prior knowledge permits a percept to emerge from an otherwise meaningless stimulus. Sources of this modi¢cation have been identi¢ed in parietal cortex and in prefrontal cortex. Modi¢cation of early processing areas also occurs on the basis of prior knowledge about the predicted sensory e¡ects of the subject's own actions.
T H E PH YSIOLO GIC A L BA SI S OF PE RC E P T ION
We take perception to refer to our conscious experience of sensory input. For perception to occur incoming sensations must be imbued with meaning on the basis of our past experience and prior knowledge. In this case the neural activity which most directly relates to our perceptual experience will not be the a¡erent signals which re£ect accurately the physical properties of the visual scene, but activity re£ecting integration of these signals from the outside world with prior knowledge stored in our brains. Our purpose in this paper is to review experiments which have identi¢ed brain regions where activity corresponds to perception and to suggest a framework for investigating how a¡erent signals interact with prior knowledge and expectations.
How can we study perceptual processes in the human brain? In the last few years new functional brain imaging techniques have made considerable advances. The two major techniques are positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Both these techniques depend on the observation that neural activity consumes energy, and consequently, is followed by local increases in blood £ow in order that energy stores can be replenished. We can use measures of local changes in blood £ow to provide a sensitive index of local changes in neural activity. The spatial resolution of these techniques is between 5 and 15 mm, and the temporal resolution between 10 and 30 s. This permits the study of brain activity at the systems level (i.e. where the fundamental unit of activity is not the single cell, but the pattern of activity in a large population of neurons). This raises the exciting possibility of identifying the physiological underpinnings of cognitive theories of brain function (for an account of PET and fMRI see ). Although we are still at the beginning of this research programme, much has been learned about the physiological basis of perception.
. W H E R E SENSORY I N PU T I S NOT E NOUG H (a) Brain regions where neural activity re£ects perception
One situation in which prior knowledge has a marked e¡ect is in the perception of impoverished pictures. If a full grey-scale photograph is su¤ciently fragmented or impoverished, then the object shown in the picture becomes extremely di¤cult to recognize (¢gure 1). However, if the viewer is shown the original picture Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (1997) 352, 1221^1230 then, when the impoverished picture is viewed again, the object can now be perceived in the sense that the viewer recognizes what is depicted (Ramachandran 1994) .
This phenomenon naturally lends itself to a brain imaging study. Brain activity can be measured when the person is viewing the meaningless arrangement of blobs and this can be compared with the activity elicited when the viewer, on the basis of prior knowledge, can perceive the object (Dolan et al. 1997) . In both these conditions the visual input is identical. Activity in brain areas which re£ect purely visual input will be the same. However, regions which re£ect perception, rather than visual input, will show di¡erent activity in the two conditions. Using this approach we included two classes of pictures; one of objects and one of faces. First the volunteers viewed the impoverished picture without prior knowledge and perceived nothing meaningful. The knowledge about the pictures was then supplied by showing the volunteers the full grey scale version prior to the scan in which they saw the impoverished picture for the second time. There was no change of activity in primary visual areas, con¢rming that these areas were re£ecting visual input rather than perception. When the object or face in the picture was now perceived signi¢cant increases in activity were detected in two brain regions: in medial parietal cortex (the precuneus; ¢gure 2) and in the fusiform gyrus (inferotemporal cortex; ¢gure 3).
The fusiform gyrus is part of extra-striate cortex (the so-called visual association areas). This area was more active on the left for objects and on the right for faces. There is much previous evidence that the fusiform gyrus (inferotemporal cortex) is specialized for the perception of objects of various kinds. For example, Tanaka et al. (1991) showed that cells in this region responded best to various complex ¢gures including hands and faces. Similar evidence in humans comes from brain imaging studies (Haxby et al. 1991; Clark et al. 1996) . In particular, the right fusiform gyrus seems to be specialized for the perception of faces (De Renzi 1986; Sergent et al. 1992) . It is plausible, therefore, that the perception of objects and faces is associated with activity in the fusiform gyrus.
The modulation of this activity by prior knowledge of the stimulus could also occur in this area. The presentation of the full grey scale picture could leave traces (priming) in terms of modi¢ed synaptic connections so that the presentation of an impoverished version of the picture would be su¤cient to re-elicit the activity previously associated with the complete version of the picture. However, this account leaves no role for the activation we observed in medial parietal cortex. In contrast to what happened in the fusiform gyrus, the activity in this area did not distinguish between the type of object perceived. Little is known about the function of the medial parietal area identi¢ed in this study. Previous brain imaging studies suggest that this region is involved in a crude form of imagery associated with long-term memory (Fletcher et al. 1995) . It is activated during retrieval from memory, particularly when the items being retrieved have a high degree of imageability. Detailed analysis of the pattern of activity across all twelve scans in our study of impoverished pictures yielded evidence of an interaction between the precuneus and the right fusiform area when perceiving faces and between the precuneus and the left fusiform area when perceiving objects. On the basis of these interactions we propose that reactivating a memory representation of the picture requires the precuneus which can`tune' the response of the fusiform area so that the gaps can be ¢lled in when the impoverished version of the picture is presented for a second time. This leads to perception of the object or face in spite of the impoverished input. In this account the fusiform gyrus is a site where a¡erent inputs are modi¢ed by prior knowledge so as to give rise to the perception and recognition of the stimulus. The precuneus is a source from where these modulatory signals arise. In this example our suggestion of the need for a separate site and source remains somewhat speculative, since knowledge of the full picture might remain as traces in the region where the visual input was analysed. However, in the next section we shall describe paradigms in which priming of activity in a single region by prior visual input is not su¤cient to explain changes in perception. These paradigms are all concerned with attention.
(b) Modi¢cation of perception by attention Figure 4 shows a large letter (S) made up of small letters (L). If we are asked to report what letter is presented we can respond either at the global level (S) or at the local level (L). In this paradigm the phenomenon of priming by a previous visual input is insu¤cient to determine whether we attend to global or local features. Our attention can be directed by verbal instructions or determined by an act of will. In these cases there is no prior visual input available to prime the region concerned with perception. The priming signal must have arrived from some other brain region. We (Fink et al. 1996) showed volunteers hierarchically organized visual ¢gures in which a large letter was constructed from small letters (as in ¢gure 4).
In one condition volunteers saw a sequence of such ¢gures and attended to the local level throughout the scan. In another condition they attended to the global level. It should be noted that the set of stimuli presented were the same in both conditions. Attention at the global level was associated with increased activity in the right lingual gyrus, while attention to the local level was associated with activity in left inferior occipital cortex (see ¢gure 5).
The precise function of these areas is unknown, but they are part of extra-striate cortex (`visual association' areas). As far as we can tell, the focus in the left inferior occipital cortex (local processing) falls between V1/V2 and V2/V3 boundaries while the focus in the right lingual gyrus (global processing) lies anterior to the V2/V3 boundaries. Almost certainly both these areas are concerned with di¡erent aspects of form processing. The laterality of these e¡ects is consistent with ¢ndings from previous studies in patients with circumscribed lesions (Robertson & Lamb 1991) . Patients with leftsided lesions have problems with local processing, while patients with right-sided lesions have problems with global processing. The sites of the modulatory e¡ects we observed are, however, some distance from the lesion sites which lead to dysfunctions in local or global processing.
The brain regions concerned with local and global features have yet to be studied in detail. However, the direction of attention to simpler features has received detailed investigation. A key study in this respect is that of Corbetta and his colleagues (1991) . Volunteers were shown complex visual displays in which variations occurred in colour, form and movement. When volunteers attended to changes in colour, neural activity (indexed by changes in blood £ow) increased in part of extra-striate cortex centred on the lingual gyrus. When the volunteers observed the same display, but now attended to changes in movement, activity increased in a more lateral part of the extra-striate cortex at the occipito-temporal junction. Similar areas had previously been activated in a very di¡erent type of study by Zeki et al. (1991) . In this study volunteers passively observed di¡erent stimuli. Their state of attention remained constant, but the stimulus varied. When coloured stimuli were contrasted with black and white stimuli, increased activity was seen in the lingual and fusiform gyrus. When moving stimuli were compared with stationary ones the more lateral region at the occipito-temporal junction became active. These areas have been identi¢ed as homologues of the colour and motion areas (V4 & V5), identi¢ed in monkey extra-striate cortex on the basis of single cell recording studies. Although colour and motion are basic visual features, these colour and motion areas are in extrastriate (the so-called visual association areas), rather than primary visual cortex. We know from other studies that signals in these areas do not simply re£ect visual input. For example, activity in V4 (the colour area) represents perceived colour rather than wavelength and therefore re£ects visual inputs modi¢ed by the processes that give rise to colour constancy (Zeki 1983) . The results of these experiments by Zeki and by Corbetta show that we can activate the colour area either by presenting coloured stimuli to a passive subject (bottom-up processing) or by asking volunteers actively to attend to colour (top-down processing). In the second case, prior knowledge about what to attend to has modi¢ed the response of a region concerned with a speci¢c aspect of early visual processing.
On the basis of this and other studies of selective attention we can conclude that prior speci¢cation of the focus of attention causes a modi¢cation of the neural response in brain areas specialized for the analysis of the appropriate features. (There may also be inhibitory e¡ects on areas concerned with irrelevant or distracting stimuli; Haxby et al. (1994) ). Activity in these areas correlates with perception rather than sensory input. These studies have identi¢ed the site of modulation associated with attention and perception, but where is the source of this modulation?
(c) Identifying the source Information about brain areas concerned with the processing of global and local features has previously been obtained from the study of patients with circumscribed lesions. These studies suggest that impairments in attending to global or local features of stimuli are associated with damage to the right or the left hemisphere, respectively. However, the most common location for this damage is in lateral temporo-parietal areas (Robertson & Lamb 1991) . As already mentioned, these areas are a considerable distance from the extra-striate areas identi¢ed in our brain imaging study. This discrepancy is not surprising. Problems with attending speci¢cally to global or local features, while retaining the ability to discriminate such features, occur because the patient is no longer able to modify activity in the target areas (the sites) even though these areas can still function adequately enough to ensure that the appropriate shape analysis occurs. This implies that the damage has a¡ected the source of the modulation (or the connections between site and source). Damage to the target areas would lead to fundamental problems with form perception rather than problems with attention to di¡erent aspects of the scene.
How can we use functional imaging to identify the source of the signals by which prior knowledge a¡ects perception? As we have already shown, the site of modulation is determined primarily by the object of attention. These sites will be in di¡erent locations determined by the nature of the attended object or speci¢c features of an object. However, we propose that there is only one source for this modulation, directing its signal to one or other of the sites. If there were two sources, then the problem would remain as to how one source, rather than the other, would`know' that it was supposed to be active in a given situation.
In our study of global and local processing there were two conditions; attending to global or attending to local features. The single source of the relevant modulatory signal would be active in both conditions and would therefore be rendered`invisible' by categorical comparison of the two conditions. In order to identify the source we designed a second study in which volunteers had to switch attention between global and local processing throughout the scan (Fink et al. 1996, experiment 2) . In this paradigm the task of the volunteer was to report whether a target letter (e.g. A) was present at the global or the local level. In one condition the number of switches required between the local and the global level was low; the target letter was presented at the local level for the ¢rst six scans, and at the global level for the second six scans. In another condition the rate of switching between the local and the global level was high. Across the 12 scans the number of switches was varied systematically between one and 35 per minute, while the time spent at either the global or the local level was kept constant at 50% during the 30 s scanning window. We found that the longer attention was sustained at one or other level (i.e. the fewer the switches) the greater the activity in a region of the right temporal-parietal-occipital junction (see ¢gure 6). The identi¢cation of this area as the source of the modulation is entirely consistent with the results from studies of patients with lesions.
In this level switching paradigm the direction of attention is not determined by prior instructions, but by a combination of the visual input and a memory of the speci¢ed target letter. While attention is sustained at one level, we presume that knowledge about the target letter is used to`tune' areas concerned with detection of features at either the local or the global level. Does the temporo-parietal-occipital junction contain some abstract representation of the target letter that can be used for this purpose, or is activity in this area required to`hold' the early visual areas in a particular state of`tuning'?
Switching between levels in this local/global task was elicited by the stimulus. The prespeci¢ed target could Brain imaging and perception C. Frith and R. J. Dolan 1225 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (1997) Figure 6 . A horizontal slice through the brain. The cross hairs pick out an area in the right temporo-parietal cortex where activity was associated with the requirement to sustain attention to either the global or the local level.
appear at either the local or the global level and the volunteer had to switch his attention accordingly. Presumably a higher source of modulation is engaged when attention is switched endogenously (i.e. the volunteer decides for himself where to direct attention). It is far more di¤cult to design functional imaging experiments to visualize such high level sources. Essentially we have to compare two conditions; in one, volunteers have to attend selectively to some object or feature; in the other, they must not attend to these features or, ideally, to anything else. Clearly the mental state of a volunteer in such a condition of`inattention' is never going to be well controlled. Nevertheless,`passive' viewing has been a commonly used condition in functional imaging studies and can give useful results.
For example, in a recent study (using fMRI) volunteers either passively viewed a ¢eld of white dots on a black background which appeared to move towards them (motion in depth), or attended to this ¢eld of dots in order to detect subtle changes in the rate of movement (Bu« chel et al. 1997 ). There were two other conditions; one in which the volunteers passively viewed a stationary ¢eld of dots and a baseline condition in which they viewed the black background without the dots. When brain activity was compared across these conditions, three distinct patterns of activity could be observed, as follows.
(ii). In primary visual cortex (V1) there were highly signi¢cant activations when viewing dots was contrasted with viewing a black background. There was, however, little further increase in activity in this area when the dots moved or when the volunteers attended to this movement. This area re£ects aspects of visual input, but is not much a¡ected by attention.
(ii). When moving dots were contrasted with stationary dots, signi¢cant increases in activity were observed in a number of extra-striate visual areas, including the occipito-temporal junction (V5). When volunteers attended to motion, activity in these areas increased still further, replicating the results of Corbetta and his colleagues. We identify these areas as the site of modulation by attention.
(iii). A number of areas were more active when attention was compared with passive viewing. These areas included right prefrontal cortex, premotor cortex (including the frontal eye ¢elds), anterior cingulate cortex, the insula and the thalamus. These areas did not show any di¡erence in activity between moving and stationary dots viewed passively.
This result is in agreement with a wide range of studies suggesting that there is a`network' of regions that are activated during tasks that require attention (Mesulam 1990 ). These include prefrontal cortex, premotor cortex and anterior cingulate cortex. It is thought that these di¡erent areas have di¡erent speci¢c functions in relation to attention. For example, the frontal eye ¢elds might be concerned with preparation for an appropriate response. We assume the source of the signals that modulate activity in the extra-striate areas is to be found somewhere in this attentional network. However, it is not possible from the simple comparisons between conditions described here to decide which of the many areas might be considered to be the source. On anatomical grounds, posterior parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are the most likely candidates, since these areas have dense connections to the relevant sites of modulation (prefrontal cortexposterior parietal cortex, Petrides & Pandya (1984) ; posterior parietal cortex^V5, Cavada & Goldman Rakic (1989) ). We assume that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex modulates posterior parietal cortex which, in turn, modulates V5. Following Posner, we would suggest that the posterior parietal cortex is concerned with exogenous shifts of attention caused by external stimuli, while the prefrontal cortex is concerned with voluntary, endogenous shifts of attention. Currently, new methods of analysis are being developed which are based on correlations between activity in di¡erent regions rather than simple comparisons (e¡ective connectivity, Friston (1994) ; structural equation modelling, McIntosh & Gozalez-Lima (1994) ). These methods will permit direct assessment of interactions between brain areas and should provide better means for identifying sources of modulation.
(d) Prior knowledge about action
So far we have discussed situations in which the prior knowledge that is applied comes from the past. On the basis of images from the past (e.g. the full grey scale picture) the relevant perceptual areas are modi¢ed. However, such modulations can also be based on prior knowledge which enables us to predict what sensory changes will happen in the future. We are implicitly making such predictions whenever we perform an action. For example, if we move a limb, there will be perceptual changes consequent upon this movement, such as our feeling of the new position of the limb, and possibly the sight of our limb, moving across the visual ¢eld. The most famous example is supplied by von Helmholtz (1866) who wondered how it could be that the world did not appear to move about every time we moved our eyes. Clearly the image of the world must move across our retina, but yet we perceive the world as stationary. Helmholtz proposed that information from the command signal to move the eye could be used to cancel the movement signals from the retina. In other words we can predict the sensory changes caused by our movements on the basis of e¡erent signals arising in the motor system which determine the movement. These predicted sensory changes, which are based on motor commands, are referred to as the`forward model' (Wolpert et al. 1995) . This prior knowledge based on intended actions can be used to modify our perception.
There are several studies in which action has been shown to a¡ect perception. For example, elevated thresholds for the perception of a touch to the ¢nger are observed when the ¢nger is being moved (Rushton et al. 1981) . Creutzfeldt et al. (1989) recorded from electrodes implanted in the temporal cortex (auditory association areas) of patients undergoing neurosurgery, and found areas where activity decreased when the patient was vocalizing. With regard to the visual system, Paus et al. (1996) showed that eye movements a¡ected activity in the visual cortex. Volunteers were scanned while they moved their eyes, at di¡erent rates, in the dark. As rate of eye movement increased, there was increased activity in the frontal eye ¢elds, but reduced activity in primary visual cortex (V1). A similar e¡ect was observed by Wenzel et al (1996) who observed reduction of activity in V1 during involuntary eye movements (nystagmus), induced by vestibular stimulation. These observations may well relate to the phenomenon of saccadic suppression. However, we can hardly claim that these e¡ects of eye movements on the visual system are due to the application of a forward model. Application of such a model would involve more complex modulation of perception than the simple reduction of activity in primary visual cortex (V1). Furthermore, in the study by Wenzel et al. (1996) the eye movements were involuntary, so that any forward model could not have been based on an intention to move the eyes. The mechanisms by which intentions in£uence subsequent perception have yet to be examined with functional imaging.
(e) A framework for distinguishing site and source A major theme of this paper has been the distinction between site and source. We have used the term`site' to refer to the brain regions where activity underpins perception. In these regions signals re£ecting sensory input are modi¢ed by signals re£ecting prior knowledge and expectations. In contrast we have used the term source' to refer to the brain regions in which these modifying signals arise.`Site' regions can be identi¢ed because activity here is altered by changing sensory input (e.g. stationary versus moving dots) and by changes in perception or attention (e.g. attended versus unattended). Source' regions are not a¡ected by changing sensory input, but re£ect level and, possibly direction, of attention. A feature of regions that are the site of perceptual modi¢cations not examined in the studies reviewed so far, concerns the time course of the changes in activity. In those regions directly concerned with sensory input, we would expect to see a transient increase in activity each time the stimulus was presented. We would not expect to see such transient responses in source regions. Functional imaging techniques such as pet integrate activity over several seconds, and thus cannot distinguish transient from sustained activity directly. However, we can get an indirect estimate of transient activity (i.e. the increase in activity associated with presentation of a single stimulus) by varying the rate of presentation of stimuli. Using pet, a number of studies have shown that there is a linear relationship between the number of stimuli presented during the scanning window and the amount of activity in relevant brain areas (e.g. Price et al. 1992) . For example, the total activity in the auditory cortex is directly proportional to the number of tones presented during the scan.This relationship indicates that there is a transient increase in activity elicited by each tone. The slope of the line is a measure of the amount of activity elicited by each tone. Thus, by varying the rate of stimulus presentation we can distinguish between areas which show transient or sustained activity. We have used this principle to identify sites and sources in experiments on selective attention (Frith & Friston 1996) and object categorization (Rees et al. 1997) .
PE RC E P T ION W I T HOU T S E N S ORY I N PU T (a) Mental imagery
A normal percept arises from an interaction between a¡erent signals and prior knowledge. This formulation suggests the possibility of two kinds of extreme occurrence. In one situation the percept is entirely determined by prior knowledge. In the other, the percept fails to be appropriately modi¢ed by prior knowledge. We suggest that both cases can lead to hallucinations, but that these two kinds of hallucinatory experience will be qualitatively di¡erent. However, we must also accept that normal mental imagery may also be an example of a percept that is entirely dependent upon prior knowledge. Such images are not hallucinations since we are aware that their origin is`in our heads' and not in the outside world.
To date more is known about motor imagery than visual imagery. There is good evidence that motor imagery engages similar brain regions as those involved in motor preparation (Jeannerod 1994). Thus, asking someone to imagine making a movement activates very much the same areas as asking someone to prepare to make that movement (Stephan et al. 1995) . Consequently, we can infer that the same processes are involved. We suggest that there is a close analogy between motor preparation and selective attention. Thus, preparing to perceive a particular stimulus or feature (selective attention) is analogous to preparing to make a particular movement. A number of brain imaging studies con¢rm that mental imagery in various modalities is accompanied by increased activity in the appropriate modality-speci¢c brain regions. For example, imagining the sound of someone's voice increases activity in superior temporal cortex (auditory association cortex) in addition to frontal regions, including Broca's area, concerned with speech production (McGuire et al. 1996) . Performing tasks requiring visual imagery activates the occipital cortex, possibly including the primary visual cortex (Kosslyn 1996). We would expect imaging colour or movement to activate the same regions as those observed when volunteers attend to colour or movement (as in the study of Corbetta and colleagues). We are not aware of any brain imaging studies in which volunteers were simply asked to imagine colour or motion. In one study, however, volunteers were asked to name the colours of objects presented in the form of achromatic line drawings or words (Martin et al. 1995) . No activity was seen in the posterior part of the fusiform gyrus believed to be the homologue of the colour area, V4. However, activity was seen in inferior temporal cortex 2 or 3 cm anterior to V4. This is an area in which cells are responsive to colour in combination with other object related features (Tanaka et al. 1991) . Activity was also seen at the parietal^occipital junction. This area does not seem to contain colour responsive cells, but lesions of this area in neurological patients have been Brain imaging and perception C. Frith and R. J. Dolan 1227 associated with`amnesia' for the colours of objects (Varney & Digre 1983) .
(b) The impoverished nature of imagery
Most of the time mental imagery is strikingly di¡erent from our perception of the real world. For one thing imagery is far less vivid. However, this di¡erence seems not just to be quantitative; mental images lack more than just vividness. There is a qualitative di¡erence that Gregory (1996) proposes results from a lack of`qualia' in mental images. In the mental image we know that something is blue. In the percept of the real world we experience it as blue. Gregory suggests that percepts of the real world have qualia precisely to enable us to distinguish them from mental images.There is another feature of mental images (which we shall discuss in more detail below) which concerns their`deadness'. They are like still life (nature morte) rather than real life. This is because they are generated solely by our brain without unexpected or uncontrolled inputs from the outside world. This property of images has been demonstrated experimentally by Riesberg (1987) using the Necker cube. It is well known that if we look at a drawing of a cube in which all the 12 lines joining the vertices are visible then our percept will spontaneously reverse from time to time (see ¢gure 7). Riesberg showed naive subjects this cube very brie£y so that they did not experience a reversal. They were then asked to imagine the cube. No subject ever reported a reversal while imagining the cube. The image of the cube had only one form on the basis of prior knowledge. The lack of incoming stimuli about the cube prevented this prior knowledge from being over-ruled and the percept was frozen.
This observation has interesting implications for creativity (Fish & Scrivener 1990) . Creation that takes place entirely`in the head' is likely to be impoverished since there is no escape from the constraints imposed by prior knowledge and brain structure.To avoid these constraints most people externalize their creative processes by the use of sketches, exercises and other preliminaries.
(c) Hallucinosis: percepts imposed by prior knowledge
In certain neurological cases it seems that prior knowledge can interact with`random' sensory input to create a percept. A striking example of this phenomenon is called a functional experiential hallucination. In one such case (Lam et al. 1997 ) a patient described how she heard excerpts from television programmes, including voices and background music, whenever she started her washing machine.The experience stopped as soon as the washing machine was switched o¡. In a visual version of this phenomenon a patient, watching a ¢lm in which the screenwas ¢lled with the image of a rough sea, saw, superimposed upon this, an image of Ginger Rogers dancing (Critchley 1951) . These hallucinations are triggered (or carried) by sensory inputs and may consist of memories that are su¤ciently vivid to be experienced as real (and believed to be real at least for the ¢rst few times that they occur). However, the patient does not develop the sorts of delusions about these experiences that are typically associated with hallucinations in schizophrenia (see below). Visual hallucinations associated with brain damage are rare, and we are unaware of any experimental studies of this phenomenon. In some cases visual hallucinations are observed in the blind ¢eld of patients with damage to early visual areas of the brain. In these cases the experience is obviously not driven by sensory stimuli, but seems to be associated with random neural activity in the damaged area. Such hallucinations often cease when the patient is treated with antiepileptic drugs (Lance 1976) . Other cases are associated with damage in the thalamus and the parietal cortex (Noda et al. 1993; Critchley 1951) . Both these areas are part of the circuit revealed by brain imaging to be involved in the modulation of sensory processes by attention. There seem to be qualitative di¡erences in the hallucinations associated with damage to di¡erent regions, but too few cases have been reported to reach any de¢nite conclusions.
(d) Hallucinations: misperception of action
In the case of hallucinosis, we suggest that the sites of perception receive aberrant sensory input which is then modi¢ed by prior knowledge, giving rise to false perceptions. The hallucinations associated with psychosis seem to re£ect a di¡erent mechanism. Many patients with schizophrenia hear voices in the absence of any auditory input (discussed in Frith (1996) ). There are many di¡er-ences in these experiences from the`hallucinosis' we described in the previous section. The patients hear formed voices (rather than unformed sounds) that usually talk to, or about the patient. In many cases the voices may command the patient to do things against the patient's own wishes. In other words the voices seem to come from an external`agent' who is communicating with the patient and is trying to in£uence his/her behaviour. In most cases the patient also has`delusions'about the voices involving elaborate beliefs about where the voices come from and what they are trying to achieve (e.g.`MI5 is using magnetic rays to broadcast messages. They prevent me from approaching my cousin, the Queen').The pattern of brain activity associated with the experience of hallucinations seems to involve left hemisphere language areas, including inferior frontal cortex (Broca's area) and superior temporal cortex (Wernicke's area) (McGuire et al. 1993; Silbersweig et al. 1995) . These areas are also activated when normal people imagine someone speaking. That verbal hallucinations`share resources' with various aspects of language has also been shown in behavioural studies (David 1994) . Listening to reasonably complex sounds reduces the severity and frequency of hallucinations as does verbal articulation. Clearly these hallucinations are in some sense`self-generated' since there is no auditory input involved. In some cases there is direct evidence of such self-generation. For example, some patients describe an experience (thought broadcasting, thought echo) in which they hear their own thoughts spoken aloud. Many patients mutter and this muttering can sometimes be ampli¢ed su¤ciently to make out the content of the speech (Gould 1949) . This content often corresponds precisely to what the patient reports the`voices' to be saying.
Why do these patients experience this self-generated verbal material as if it came from the outside world? We have suggested that this misperception arises because the patient's intentions no longer produce the appropriate e¡ects on perceptual areas of the brain (Frith 1996) . One line of evidence comes from studies in which patients have to monitor their own intentions to act. Di¤culty with such monitoring is suggested by failure to correct simple limb movement errors in the absence of visual feedback (Frith & Done 1989) . In addition, patients have di¤culty remembering their own actions when these were carried out without visual feedback (Mlakar et al. 1994) . In both cases these results suggest that patients' knowledge about their own actions depends more on seeing what they have done rather than knowing in advance what they will do. Direct evidence for a misperception of their own actions comes from an experiment in which the sound of the patient's own voice (fed back without delay through earphones) was distorted. When patients in an acute phase of their illness experienced such feedback, they made comments such as`someone else is speaking when I speak. There is an evil spirit speaking when I speak' (Cahill et al. 1996) . The speech sounds they heard, although generated by themselves, were readily experienced as coming from an independent agent in the outside world.
At the physiological level we have demonstrated functional' disconnections in schizophrenic patients between frontal and temporal areas in the language system in the left hemisphere of the brain (Friston & Frith 1995) . Such disconnections could certainly account for a failure of frontal areas concerned with speech production to modulate temporal areas concerned with speech perception. However, much work needs to be done before we have a full explanation of experiences such as thought broadcasting.
(e) Perception of the self In terms of our framework, disconnections between sites and source would lead to a site of perception that was no longer appropriately modi¢ed by sources of prior knowledge and expectations, derived in this case from intended actions. This lack of modi¢cation leads to false perceptions. We still understand little of how action in£uences perception. Nevertheless, it has long been recognized that this interaction is of fundamental importance for our understanding of the world (Russell 1996) . For example, Kant (in the second analogy section of the Critique of Pure Reason) made the distinction between self-determined and world-determined sequences of perception. We can move our gaze from the ship anchored in the harbour to the distant horizon and we can then reverse our gaze back to the ship. However, when we watch the ship sailing over the distant horizon we cannot reverse the sequence of perception. The ability to make this distinction between changes in perception caused by our own actions and those that occur because of independent events in the outside world is fundamental to the development of a sense of ourselves as agents (Russell 1996) . By making this distinction we can learn to separate those aspects of the world we can control from those we can not. When something goes wrong very early in life with the mechanism that permits this distinction our sense of self can not properly develop (as may be the case in autism). If the mechanisms goes wrong later in life we may start misperceiving independent agents in the world where there are none (as may the case in schizophrenia). We propose that a fundamental component of this mechanism involves the modi¢cation of perception by prior knowledge of action.
Given that perception is, in general, the result of an interaction between sensory signals and prior knowledge, it is useful at the physiological level to distinguish between sources of signals re£ecting prior knowledge and sites where these signals modi¢ed sensory inputs. Functional brain imaging provides a means for localizing sources and sites and has the potential to reveal some aspects of the mechanisms underlying perception. However, the temporal resolution of the technique is far from perfect at between 10 and 30 seconds. The time for signals to reach early visual processing areas is of the order of 30 ms and an 80 ms presentation time is su¤cient for an object to be recognized. Brain imaging studies will need to be supplemented by techniques such as EEG and MEG. Only these techniques can achieve the millisecond time scale at which perception occurs.
